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TORTURE AS A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDING FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: FILARTIGA V. PENA-IRALA
AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
NEIL J. CONWAY*

In Filartigav. Pefia-IralaIthe United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over an action between foreign nationals for the wrongful
death by torture of a seventeen year old boy in Paraguay. Reversing
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
the Second Circuit held that deliberate torture committed by a foreign
police official violates international law, and that an action may
therefore be brought in district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (The
Alien Tort Statute).2 The Alien Tort Statute, rarely invoked since its
enactment in 1789, reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.'
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Irving Kaufman,
relied on several doctrines to extend the reach of the Alien Tort Statute
to include acts of torture: the transitory tort doctrine, the incorporation of international law into the federal common law, the evolving
nature of international law, and the 18th century doctrine of hostis
humani generis.4 The Filartiga decision is the first attempt by a
federal court to use international human rights law as a basis for
establishing jurisdiction under this statute.5 The court eliminated any

Member of class of Antioch School of Law, 1983.
Dolly M.E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980). The case began as a clinical project at the Antioch School of Law Immigration and
Naturalization Clinic to obtain asylum for Dolly Filartiga, the sister of the decedent.
Originally the Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch.20 § 9(b), I Stat. 67, 77 (1789).
Jurisdiction has only been sustained twice in the history of the Alien Tort Statute; Bolchas
v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S. C. 1795) (maritime seizure case brought to determine the title to
property taken on board an enemy vessel); and Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F.
Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (child custody suit involving passport fraud).
I Blum and Steinhardt, FederalJurisdictionOver InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The
Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53, 56 (1981).
5 630 F.2d at 885; See also Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of InternationalLaw:
Filartigav. Pena-Irala,33 STAN. L. REV. 353 (1981).
*
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question as to the statute's constitutionality by finding federal jurisdiction authorized under Article III, since international law has always
been an "integral part" of our federal common law. 6 Hence, any
alleged torturer who can be served with process in the United States
can be subject to suit in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute.
This Comment considers the doctrinal bases on which subject
matter jurisdiction was upheld in Filartigaand the implications for
future human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. Part I
presents the factual genesis of the case and the bases for the Second
Circuit's decision. Part II analyzes Judge Kaufman's expansive interpretation of international declarations and treaties as evidence of an
emerging norm of customary international law. Part III examines the
constitutionality of the Second Circuit's assumption of federal jurisdiction in light of alternative choice of law considerations and the prospect of future case law under the statute. Part IV discusses how the
court viewed the problems posed by the abstention doctrines-forum
non conveniens and act of state.
I.

THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF FILARTIGA

A. Torture in Paraguay
The facts in Filartigawere not disputed. Appellants were the
father and sister of Joelito Filartiga, the young boy who was tortured
to death by the defendant and others in 1976. Dr. Filartiga, Joelito's
father, has run a medical clinic for the impoverished residents of the
Ybycoui Valley in Paraguay for over twenty years. 7 During this time
he became a political opponent of the government of President Alfredo Stroessner, which has ruled Paraguay since 1954.8
6 630 F.2d at 886; International law was known as the "law of nations" in the 18th
Century.
630 F.2d at 876. Additional information obtained from the file on Paraguay maintained

at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D.C. Dr. Filartiga is also known for his
artwork portraying peasant life in Paraguay.
8 In an affidavit presented at the trial Dolly Filartiga stated: "Because the defendant Pena
will never be brought to justice in Paraguay, this lawsuit presents. . . the only means by which I
can seek justice for my brother's death and my injuries. The International League for Human
Rights, -Amnesty International, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the
Organization of American States have all noted that the Paraguayan judiciary is no more than an
appendage of the executive branch, in particular General Stroessner and his dreaded police, of
which Pena is a noted member."
Many international human rights organizations, including the International League for
Human Rights and Amnesty International, have confirmed that torture and gross human rights
violations are systematically committed by the Stroessner regime. These violations have provided

the basis for the suspension of international loans and protests by the United States. See also
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Joelito was kidnapped and tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pena-Irala (hereinafter Pena), the Police Commissioner of Asunci6n, Paraguay in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's political activities. 9
Dolly and Dr. Filartiga had been unsuccessful in the initial criminal
trial held in Paraguay.' 0 During the trial the defense produced a
witness, Hugo Duarte, who confessed to the murder. Duarte claimed
that he found Joelito in bed with his wife, and that the crime was one
of passion." To refute this claim, Dolly Filartiga offered evidence of
three independent 2autopsies showing severe marks of torture on the
defendant's body.'
Pena fled to the United States in July, 1978, under a visitor's visa,
in the midst of the controversy surrounding his criminal trial in Paraguay.1 3 He remained in the United States beyond the term of his visa,
and was subsequently arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.' 4 While Pena was being held in the Brooklyn Navy Yard
pending deportation, Dolly Filartiga and her attorney served Pena
with the summons and civil complaint of the instant case.' 5 The
district court granted a stay of deportation, but subsequent attempts
to prolong the stay failed. Consequently, Pena and his traveling companion, Juana Bautista Villalba, escaped by obtaining voluntary departure in lieu of deportation.' On remand to the district court, Pena
failed to appear, and a default judgment was entered against him.
The case is still pending, awaiting a hearing on the damages issue.
Comment, infra note 22, citing the American Branch of the International Law Association,
Practitioner Notebook No. 7 (June, 1979) at note 7.
9 630 F.2d at 878.
10 "... Dr. Filartiga's attorney was arrested and brought to police headquarters where,
shackled to the wall, Pena threatened him with death. This attorney, it is alleged, has since been
disbarred without just cause." Id.
11 630 F.2d at 878.
12 This contention was confirmed by investigators from the Organization of American States
(OAS). OAS Complaint is attached to the original complaint in this action.
13Dr. Filartiga displayed the mutilated body of his son in his home for hundreds of people to
see prior to the burial. IPS file, supra note 7.
11 630 F.2d at 878-9.
15Dolly Filartiga and her attorney, Michael Maggio of the Antioch School of Law Immigration and Naturalization Clinic in Washington, D.C., were joined by attorneys from the Center
for Constitutional Rights, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, Amnesty International, the International Human Rights Law Group, the Council for Hemispheric Affairs, the
Washington Office on Latin America, the International League for Human Rights and the
Lawyer's Committee for International Human Rights.
10 Voluntary departure was premised on a finding by an administrative law judge of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service that Pena was of good moral character. (Information
obtained from an interview with the Filartigas' attorney, Michael Maggio, on January 5, 1981,
in Washington, D.C.). The Filartigas might have been able to further detain Pena if they had
served him with a writ ne exeat, which forbids persons to whom it is issued to leave the
jurisdiction of the court. See Note, 29 HARV. L. REV. 206 (1916).
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B. The Decision
The Filartigas' complaint alleged a cause of action in tort based
on several alternative grounds, including sections of the United States
Constitution, wrongful death statutes, the United Nations Charter,
international human rights declarations, customary international
law, and the Alien Tort Statute.17 They sought $10 million dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction prohibiting
Pena's deportation to Paraguay.
Pena immediately moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for forum non conveniens. District Judge Nickerson
stated that the Filartigas' argument that official torture violates an
emerging norm of international law was compelling, but dismissed
the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 8 He felt constrained by
dicta in two recent decisions of the Second Circuit, which narrowly
interpret the phrase "law of nations" when dealing with a state's
treatment of its own nationals. Both of these cases, Dreyfus v. von
Finckl° and ITT v. Vencap Ltd. ,20 left the distinct impression that
"violations of international law do not occur when the aggrieved
parties are nationals of the acting state. ' 21
Dreyfus involved the confiscation of property of a Jewish citizen
in Nazi Germany in 1938.22 The plaintiff alleged that a relationship
existed between treaties of the United States and the act of confiscation sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. The
Second Circuit found this relationship insufficiently direct to support
jurisdiction based on Section 1350.
ITT v. Vencap Ltd. involved a suit by a Luxembourg investment
fund alleging the theft of the fund's assets by a Bahamian corporation. 23 In ITT, the Circuit Court relied on dicta in Lopes v. Reederei
Richard Schroeder24 for the general proposition that a prohibition
against theft in the municipal law of every nation is not automatically
incorporated into the law of nations. The Dreyfus and ITT cases
illustrate the restrictive, classical view of international law as involved
exclusively with relations between states. Under this view international law is inherently restricted by the political autonomy of nations
1'630

F.2d at 879. See also Complaint No. 79-6090.
11The district court never reached the issue of forum non conveniens; therefore it was not
before the Second Circuit on appeal.
19534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
20 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
21 Dreyfus v. von Finck, supra note 19, at 31.
22 For a review of case law under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, See Comment, Torture as a Violation of
the Law of Nations: An Analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 16 TEX. INT. L. J. 117, 123-34 (1981).
23 630 F.2d at 888; See also 16 TEX. INT. L. J. at 129.
24 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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unable to reach a consensus as to the degree that human rights duties
and obligations should be enforced. This approach would deny federal jurisdiction in a case like Filartiga as an infringement on the
25
territorial sovereignty of Paraguay.
The Second Circuit, however, espoused a more expansive approach in light of the unique character of Filartiga,as a case involving
acts of torture. Torture is condemned by contemporary human rights
treaties and accords, evidencing an emerging norm of customary
international law. 26 Accordingly, acts of deliberate torture constitute
"core" human rights violations, and hence are a violation of the "law
of nations. ' 27 The court concluded that the prohibition of torture has
become so widely recognized that it has risen to the level of customary
international law. Since a violation of customary international law
violates the "law of nations" within the meaning of the Alien Tort
Statute, jurisdiction under section 1350 is proper. The Filartigadecision has been criticized, however, on the ground that domestic courts
may not enforce such a prohibition where real sanctions against the
behavior in question are not prevalent throughout the international
community.
II.

TORTURE AS A VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS

In the absence of legislative history from which to infer the intent
of the First Congress in enacting Section 1350, the Filartiga court
looked to the Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana,2 8
which involved the seizure of a Cuban fishing vessel by the United

25

See McDougal and Lung-Cha Chen, Introduction: Human Rights and Jurisprudence,9

HOFSTRA L. REV. 337, 338, where the authors review the concept of enforceable international
human rights law, and its tension with the restrictive, statist approach. "... [T]he vast continuum, between these two extremes, of the contemporary, pluralistic process of authoritative
decision, remains to blush unseen. Particular preexisting rules of international law can be

changed, it is argued, only with the specific consent of states, and the very nature of 'sovereignty', 'domestic jurisdiction', 'independence', and so on precludes even a consensual change of
the rules toward a greater protection of human rights." See also, Sohn, The InternationalLaw of
Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347, 351, where the author
responds to adherents of the restrictive, statist approach by stating that gross violations of human
rights are undeniably matters of international concern and that no state can hide behind the
shield of domestic jurisdiction.
11 Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights as "Rights," 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 428, where
the author states that international human rights derives principally from contemporary international agreements.
27 630 F.2d at 880. See also Blum and Steinhart, supra note 4, where the authors list other
human rights violations which have become so widely recognized that they constitute "core"
violations, including piracy, slavery, genocide, summary court martial and torture.
28 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900).
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States Navy during the Spanish-American War. The seizure and confiscation of this vessel were found to be acts of piracy, since fishing
vessels are generally considered exempt from wartime seizure. The
Supreme Court recognized that the development of the prohibition
against piracy had become a rule of customary international law
through the "general assent of civilized nations. ' 29 Consequently, the
Filartigacourt sought to interpret the Alien Tort Statute in a manner
consistent with the "organic growth" of contemporary human rights
30
law.
The Second Circuit's appraisal of the current state of contemporary international law begins by considering the United Nations Charter as a treaty of the United States. It continues by examining various
resolutions of the United Nations, conventions, and national constitutions, in order to determine the nature of international law "not as it
was in 1789, but as it evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today."' 31 The Court also finds contemporary international law
reflected in a number of subsidiary sources of international law: the
32
It
practice of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists.

concludes that since torture is consistently condemned throughout the
international community, and since this prohibition constitutes a violation of the "law of nations" based on custom, a federal question is
created because international law is a part of the federal common
law.
Despite the promotion of human rights through numerous multilateral and regional conventions, there is intense disagreement
throughout the international community as to the legal nature of these
instruments. Filartigahas drawn criticism from jurists adhering to the
more restrictive, statist approach, who deny that a jurisprudential
basis exists for the vindication of human rights. While some commentators applaud the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga,others simply
characterize the case as ahead of its time.3 3 The decision has been
described as a "legal oddity [to be] picked up in 'but see' footnotes by
diligent scholars." 34 The arguments assailing the decision in Filartiga
630 F.2d at 881, citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
630 F.2d at 887.
31 630 F.2d at 881, citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
32 Judge Kaufman's approach is confirmed by Article 38 of the Statute of the International
21

30

Court of Justice, which states: "When the issue before the court is not the interpretation of a
substantive treaty provision between signatory states, the court must find and apply customary
rules or general principles of law to the underlying dispute."
11 For a series of commentaries both supporting and criticizing the Filartigadecision, see
Symposium-Federal Jurisdiction, Human Rights, and the Law of Nations: Essays on Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 307-41 (1981).
34 Rusk, A Comment on Filartigav. Pena Irala, 11 GA. INT'L & COMP. L. J. at 311.
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are generally based on traditional objections to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly, contrary state practice, non-intervention, and comity.3 5
A. State Practice
Critics of Filartigaargue that since many nations routinely violate the human rights of their citizens, federal jurisdiction is not
warranted in cases involving acts of torture. This argument asserts
that the limited enforceability of international treaties and accords
prohibits the use of these instruments as a measure of customary
international law. Thus, the consensus condemning the practice of
torture is illusory. Because many states that are signatories to human
rights conventions violate this prohibition on a regular basis without
being subject to sanctions, some jurists conclude that there is no legal
basis for asserting that torture is outlawed by the international legal
community.3 6 Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute is therefore
dubious, since a violation of the "law of nations" would be improperly
founded on customary international law that is contrary to the practice of states. As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has written:
...[W]e ignore Idi Amin's Uganda, the torture of officers and
men of the Pueblo by North Koreans and the prisoners of war in
Vietnam and the hostages of Iran. Likewise, we could brush aside
the Gulag Archipelago, the hollowness of such titles as People's
Democratic Republics, and the torture that we know occurs in a
number of other nations which are members in good standing of
the United Nations and which solemnly vote in favor of resolutions
prohibiting torture.37
Mr. Rusk's argument is unfairly selective; to focus on "Idi Amin's
Uganda" and similar cases is to ignore the fact that the vast majority
of nations have effectively proscribed torture. Moreover, it implies
1s See Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 75-87. For a further explanation of various
"counter arguments" against federal jurisdiction, see McDougal and Lung-Chu Chen, supra note
25, at 348. The authors state that the modern adherents of the statist approach: "... seem to be
not merely nineteenth century but medieval, not Grotian but Machiavellian. To them even
power politics does not mean using power to maintain a balance of power, an international
order, but to use power without international restraints, both internationally and especially
domestically. In their eyes a state is all powerful, it can do what it pleases with its citizens, who
are not different from cattleor other chattels and can even be exterminated like rodents without
any dire consequences. In their view, international law is a mere servant of states, an instrument
to be manipulated by governments to suit their whims with no need to account for any
violations."
36 See Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights for 1979, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
(Feb. 4, 1980).
37 Rusk, supra note 34, at 313.
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that a norm of customary international law does not exist until there is
an international sanction-that human rights, for example, must be
implemented by a world criminal court based on the consent of
nations submitting themselves to its jurisdiction. This reasoning avoids
the implications of The Paquete Habana and the practice of states
providing domestic sanctions against conduct deemed to violate international custom in the absence of specific sanctions by international
institutions. Filartiga makes the Alien Tort Statute available as a
mechanism authorizing the courts to try torturers in any domestic
forum where service of process can be effected. It responds to the
argument that a legal norm is not a norm until it is sanctioned by
bringing the sanction into existence-a procedure no more illogical
than delaying the sanction indefinitely because it does not yet exist.
The result, as the court states, is "a small but important step in the
fulfullment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal vio3
lence." 8

Filartigaprovides a domestic forum for those asserting the violation of a broadly recognized prohibition against torture. The Court's
view that torture violates international law is based not only on
conventions, treaties and accords, but on a uniformity in the practice
of states. Nations accused of allowing, systematic violations of human
rights do not defend these acts as justifiable. Instead, their strategy has
been to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, 39 dispute the facts, or
argue that the exigencies of a situation require derogation from their
international obligations.40 Further, for the Filartigas and others who
may come to the United States seeking political asylum there is no
other possible forum. The Court's decision thus vindicates the princi41
ple that for every right there must be a remedy.
The decision in Filartiga places torture on the same footing as
proscribed international acts of piracy. Presumably, any person committing torture should be on notice that (a) being properly served in
the United States may subject the perpetrator to civil suit under the
Alien Tort Statute, and (b) the United States is not a safe haven for
individuals committing acts of torture, even though the acts involved
are committed under the color of legal authority. There is no reason to

38

630 F.2d at 890.

39 Id.

40 See Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, judgment of January, 1978, series A No. 25;
cited in Filartiga at 884, note 16. Article 3 states: "No one will be subject to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 15 allows derogation from most of the
provisions of the convention, but not Article 3's prohibition of torture.
11 Known as the doctrine of ubi jus, ibi remedium.
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exclude the torturers listed by Mr. Rusk from this category, should any
of these individuals seek refuge in the United States.
B. Territorial Sovereignty and the Legal Effect
of Human Rights Instruments
There is no doubt that since World War II the international
community has demonstrated a growing concern for violations of
human rights. This interest is documented in multilateral instruments
in which the nations of the world obligate themselves to treat each
other's citizens humanely. The expectancy that members of the United
Nations will promote human rights is apparent in the language of the
42
United Nations Charter.
Article 55 of the Charter provides that the United Nations "shall
promote . ..universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." Article 56 states that member nations "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of purposes set forth in Article
55."43 The first attempt to accomplish these goals was the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.44 The Filartigacourt relied on
this declaration and numerous treaties in shaping its interpretation of
contemporary international law, particularly the Declaration on the
Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture. 45 The most
troublesome issue confronted in Filartigais whether these instruments
should be construed as forming a legal basis for federal jurisdiction in
cases alleging human rights violations. Such construction is contrary
to the traditional reluctance of the courts to judge acts arguably
within the territorial sovereignty of another nation.
41

The United Nations Charter, signed June 26, 1945, entered into Jorce, October 24, 1945,

59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
11 630 F.2d at 881. The argument against domestic courts enforcing human rights is based on
Article 2(7) of the United Nations charter providing:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
44 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doec. A/810, at 71-77 (1948).
G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. Other treaties prohibiting torture include the
CInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. G.A.O.R.
Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man, art. 26, O.A.S. Doc. No. 21 (Rev.2) 15 (1975); OEA Ser. L./V/II.23; American
Convention of Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1960, art. 5, 27, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 1, OEA Ser. A/16;
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1960, art.
2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
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The declarations and treaties entered into by the United States
were not construed as creating a private right of action prior to
Filartiga.Declarations passed by the United Nations General Assembly are Resolutions which, though they command a great deal of
respect, are not intended to have a binding legal effect. Nor are they
accompanied by a judicial enforcement machinery from which such
intent could be inferred. Similarly, the international covenants referred to in Filartigaare not self-executing. Human rights treaties do
not have the force or effect of law merely upon signing. They must
first be ratified by Congress. Consequently, the FilartigaCourt's decision has been criticized for creating a precedent binding nations to
46
international obligations beyond the scope of their agreements.
These criticisms, however, do not squarely face the methodology of
the Circuit Court's approach in Filartiga.
The Second Circuit's jurisdictional analysis does not suggest that
U.N. declarations and treaties be considered self-executing, nor does it
attempt to execute the enforcement of any human rights covenants
without the consent of signatory states. It has instead recognized a
private right to sue, after observing the development of an emerging
norm of customary international law. According to Filartiga,international treaties and accords, together with other practices of states,
imply a customary international duty to refrain from torturing human
beings under color of legal authority or otherwise.
Case law that further develops the notion that an individual has a
right to recovery for acts of torture has been promulgated under
Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter
the Convention) . 4 7 The convention exists solely within the framework
of the Council of Europe, and is widely recognized as the most advanced regional system of enforceable humanitarian law in the
world. 48 Article 25 specifically provides a procedure which individuals, as well as states, may employ to file an application with the
European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter Commission) to
investigate alleged breaches of the Convention.

4o Rusk, supra note 34; Comment, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: A Legal Remedy for Torture in
Paraguay?69 GEO. L.J. 833 (1981); Comment, infra note 82, at 5; Comment, The Alien Tort
Statute: United States Jurisdiction Over Acts of Torture Committed Abroad, 23 WM. & M. L.
REV. 103 (1981).
11 For the full text of Article 3 see supra note 40.
4' See Weil, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L. 804 (1963).
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The Commission's function is quasi-judicial. It proceeds to investigate alleged breaches of the Convention and actively seeks settlement by conciliation between the parties. 49 If settlement is not
achieved, the Commission may begin an investigation of the facts and
produce a report determining which articles of the Convention, if
any, have been violated. This report is subsequently transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers, who have the discretion to invite the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter European Court) to confirm the Commission's findings. The European Court's decision is
final.
Standards by which to measure violations of Article 3 were first
established in The Greek Case.50 Here, interrogation techniques causing mental and physical suffering were found to constitute torture in
breach of Article 3. A more provocative test of the Convention's
efficacy was initiated by Irish and Northern Irish nationals subject to
the interrogation techniques of Britain's armed forces in Northern
Ireland. In Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom,5 ' the Commission
found the application of five interrogation techniques to constitute
inhuman and degrading treatment and torture. 52 The European
Court, admittedly sensitive to publicity adverse to the interests of the
Convention's signatories, tempered the Commission's decision by finding the United Kingdom guilty of inhuman and degrading treatment,
but not torture. 3 Four of the five separate opinions that are part of
the judgment, however, dissent from the Court's analysis as being too
limited. These judges felt that the Commission's original decision was
a proper application of Article 3, and its sweeping prohibition against
torture.
More significantly, commentaries on the Irish cases state that
Article 3 of the Convention mirrors other international conventions
and declarations, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-

" Id. at 808. For a commentary on the Convention See J.E.S. Fawcett, THE APPLICATION OF
(Oxford, 1969).
50 Denmark et al. v. Greece, 11(2) Eur. Court H.R. Yearbook 690 at 731 (1968).
51 Ireland v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 5310/71, Report of the European

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

Commission of Human Rights (adopted January 25, 1976).
"' See 630 F.2d at 884, note 16, citing Eur. Court H.R., Case of Ireland v. The United
Kingdom, judgement of January 18, 1978, series A. No. 25. The interrogation techniques used by
the United Kingdom were wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, and deprivation of sleep,
food and drink.
" Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, supra note 52.
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tions. 54 The universal prohibition against torture, as articulated by
these documents, was suggested to constitute customary international
law in 1977." 5 "[I]t would appear to be a norm of international law
56
accepted and recognized by the community of states as a whole.
According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties there can be no derogation from such a norm. 5 Filartiga
then, may be viewed as a long-awaited step towards which international law has been progressing since the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. The decision is
better characterized as portending the eventuality of a universally
enforced body of human rights law than as a "legal oddity" prematurely induced by a particularly brutal fact pattern.
C. Comity
International comity can be briefly described as the courtesy
nations normally show each other when conducting international
relations. Though it has always been a significant factor in the conduct of foreign affairs, it presents an inherently weak argument
against the exercise of jurisdiction which is otherwise constitutionally
sound.
Generally, extradition is the process used to dispose of cases
involving individuals arrested in the United States, but accused of
crimes in foreign countries. The practice has been prevalent throughout the history of international law. Opponents of the Filartigadecision argue that the exercise of jurisdiction over a tort action committed in Paraguay, between Paraguayan litigants, contradicts
58
traditional notions of comity.
Not all torts are of a purely local nature. The Filartiga court
concluded that the extraterritorial nature of Pena's acts made the
exercise of jurisdiction proper under the transitory tort doctrine. This
doctrine upholds extraterritorial jurisdiction over tortious acts which
are of a "mutual, and not merely a several, concern" 59 to all nations.
Since the ITT suit involved an action alleging theft, the transitory tort
doctrine was not applicable.
-1 The four Geneva Conventions contain a provision in each, which prohibits torture, known
as Common article 3.
" O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 71 AM. J. INT'L. L. 674, 687 (1977).
-1 Id. The O'Boyle article suggests that under the doctrine of jus cogens torture is a peremptory, or general norm of international law.
57 Id. at 687-88.
58 Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 82-7.
51 630 F.2d at 888.
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The assertion of federal jurisdiction does not preclude the appli-

60
cation of a Paraguayan rule of law as an expression of comity.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals has asserted a viable government
interest by preventing torturers from seeking refuge in the United
States. Neither the statutory scheme nor the legislative history of
Section 1350 indicates that human rights violations are not to be
adjudicated under the Alien Tort Statute.6 1 Exercising jurisdiction
under Section 1350 is not only supported by current developments in
international human rights law, but is properly authorized under
Article III of the Constitution.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALIEN

TORT

STATUTE

A. Article III and "'ArisingUnder" Jurisdiction
The federal courts of the United States are courts of limited
jurisdiction. Congress may confer jurisdiction on the federal courts
within the limits of Article III, clause 2 of the Constitution.6 2 In
Filartiga,federal jurisdiction was premised on the Alien Tort Statute,
which provides for federal jurisdiction over violations of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States. Since human rights treaties
are not self-executing, alleged violations of universally recognized
norms must achieve the level of customary international law to be
within the limits dictated by Article III.
Jurisdiction "arising under" a federal statute requires a prelimi-

nary determination of whether torture is a violation of the "law of
nations." When jurisdiction is based on federal common law only an
allegation of a violation is required to sustain jurisdiction.6 3 Hence,
the threshold jurisdictional issue in Filartigawas whether the alleged
6 4
tortious conduct presented a violation of the "law of nations".
Pena contended that the jurisdiction assumed by the Court of
Appeals in Filartigawas outside the ambit of Article III. He argued
that non-treaty based violations of international law are not explicitly
authorized under Article III, and that an assumption of jurisdiction
would therefore be unconstitutional. The Second Circuit found this
claim to be without merit. According to the Court, the Alien Tort

10Blum 'and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 84.
The Alien Tort Statute's legislative history is inconclusive. See supra note 28.
62 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); See also Comment, 33 STAN. L. REV. at
81

356, supra note 5.
6 75 AM. J. INTL. L. 149, 150 (1981).
4 630 F.2d at 880.

ANTIOCH LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 2:159

statute was a part of the scheme of the federal government's control
over foreign affairs. 65 It was enacted on the presumption that the
federal government has the capacity to uphold the international obligations of the fifty states as a single nation. This interest in controlling
international relations was also the apparent intent of the First Congress in enacting the Alien Tort Statute. The Second Circuit concluded that the law of nations has long been a part of the law of the
land "to be ascertained and administered, like any other, in the
appropriate case." '6 6 The law of nations is therefore a part of the
federal common law, and an alleged violation of the law of nations
under the Alien Tort Statute creates a federal question. Section 1350 is
properly authorized under Article III of the Constitution in that it
mandates federal jurisdiction over a decidedly federal concern-international law.
B. Pena's Article I Challenge
The only specific mention of the law of nations in the Constitution is in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 10, which states that Congress has the
power to punish offenses "against the law of nations." Pena argued
that the intent of this language is to limit the integration of international law into the national law to those instances specifically defined
by Congress. 7 The Court called this claim "extravagant." 68 International law has been interpreted and applied by the courts of the
United States since Chief Justice Marshall's emphatic declaration in
The Nereide that, "the law of nations

. . .

is a part of the law of the

land."16 9 This principle was later confirmed by the Supreme Court in
The Paquete Habana,7 0 and again in Banco Nationale de Cuba v.
Sabbatino." Federal courts generally entertain cases involving inter72
pretations of international law wherever Congress has failed to act.
Thus, federal common law is created through interpretative powers
assumed when a federal question involving international law is in
issue. 73

61

630 F.2d at 885.

6 Id. at 886, citing Dickenson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the

United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952).
67 630 F.2d at 886.
68 Id.

69 630 F.2d at 887 citing The Nereide 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 338, 442 (1815).

630 F.2d at 887 citing The Paquette Habana 175 U.S. 667, 700 (1900).
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
72 See Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 58.
73 Id., note 22, at 58, stating "this would not be viewed as making federal law, however.
Rather, it would have been seen as federal courts ascertaining the common law to all courts."
70

71
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C. Protective Jurisdiction-An Alternative Analysis

Providing a private cause of action in domestic courts based on
international human rights is a provocative undertaking. It has been
suggested that if individual claims were litigated based on the concept
of "protective jurisdiction," this would be a more plausible rationale
74
for federal jurisdiction in cases like Filartiga.
Under this theory,
Congressional enactments in certain areas of federal regulation provide a basis for jurisdiction whether or not a substantive rule of
decision is available under federal law. 75 Since international law is
exclusively an area of federal concern, the enactment of the Alien Tort
Statute appropriately commits any case brought under it to the federal
courts.
For example, the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to grant
jurisdiction to the federal courts in suits involving violations of labormanagement contracts under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).76 Through the Court's
interpretative powers federal judges fashion a body of federal common law that is consistent with federal labor statutes. This type of
reasoning was alluded to in the Filartigacourt's discussion of Article
III and its characterization of international law as an area of predominantly federal concern. The result would be to grant federal jurisdiction to cases like Filartigawithout interpreting the value of international conventions. This analysis, however, has three serious
weaknesses.
First, the protective jurisdiction analysis is based on the policy
that federal courts should decide matters of predominantly federal
concern. It has not been dealt with decisively by the Supreme Court,
nor specifically applied to cases dealing with international law. Consequently, the doctrine has been described as unjustified "under any
view of the allowable scope to be given to Article III."

77

Second, the application of a state rule of law is concomitant to
the theory of protective jurisdiction. This presents a problem in cases
involving international human rights. The federal courts are left in
the uncomfortable position of choosing between two local rules of
Comment, 33 STAN. L. REV. at 360.
11 There are two competing theories of "protective jurisdiction." Professor Wechsler's would
grant federal jurisdiction whenever Congress exercises its substantive legislative powers. See
Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAW & COMP. PROB.
216 (1948). Professor Mishkin's view limits protective jurisdiction to cases in particular fields of
federal legislation. See Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157 (1953).
7o Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 474.
71
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decision in a case based on international law. For instance, in a case of
predominantly Paraguayan contacts the Filartiga court would be
faced with a choice between applying either the substantive law of
New York or Paraguayan law as the law of the situs. Paraguayan law
would be considered in its entirety, including its choice-of-law conflicts rules, which are likely to include broad immunities for officials
7
acting under the color of legal authority.
Third, Congress is not granting new rights to aliens under Section
1350. It is merely providing for federal adjudication of rights already
recognized by the international community as worthy of universal
jurisdiction.79
Although the choice of law issue presented in Filartigais clearly
distinct from the jurisdictional issue, applying the local rule of law
might also conflict with Article III's jurisdictional grant over cases
"arising under" the Constitution or treaties of the United States. 0
Since local law would define the cause of action in tort in its entirety,
the federal courts could not hear the case, as it would not arise under
the Constitution, treaties or other laws of the United States. 8' Additionally, the protective jurisdiction analysis precludes consideration of
international law as the rule of decision. The approach ignores the
basic philosophical underpinnings of human rights conventions specifying duties and obligations for the entire international legal community. Basic policy considerations of the international community are
not normally a consideration in the enactment of jurisdictional stat82
utes concerning matters to which local law must be applied.
The preferable approach is to view the Alien Tort Statute as a
federal jurisdictional grant over fundamental human rights violations,
anticipating the application of substantive law that is fashioned from
international law. International law can then be incorporated into the
federal common law as the rule of decision.8 3 The body of case law
ensuing could then develop with a uniformity unlikely to exist if the
parochial prejudices of the fifty states are vented through the application of local law to suits involving international human rights.

Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 98.
630 F.2d at 887; see also Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4.
80 See U.S. Const. art. III.
SI Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 98.
82 Comment, The Alien Tort Statute: InternationalLaw as the Rule of Decision, 49 FORD78

79

HAM L. REV. 874, 885 (1981).
1- Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 102.
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D. Hostis Humani Generis

The Filartigadecision is not as revolutionary as it may seem. It
adds torture to a narrow class of wrongs whose perpetrators are
subject to prosecution wherever they can be found, under the doctrine
of hostis humani generis. This is an 18th and early 19th century
doctrine which deemed certain acts to be so reprehensible that individuals accused of these acts could be apprehended and subject to trial
where they are found . 4 By basing jurisdiction on the Alien Tort
Statute, the Second Circuit revived a doctrine which had declined in
use in the 19th Century. The atrocities of World War II rekindled
international concern for human rights beginning with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Since then, numerous instruments have developed detailed obligations of states concerned with
the fundamental rights of individuals. To deny the importance of
international protection of human rights would be to "turn the clock
back."' 85 Section 1350 has become a vehicle through which federal
jurisdiction may promulgate international human rights law. In the
language of the Second Circuit's opinion, the torturer has now become "like the pirate and slave trader before him-an enemy of all
mankind."'86 To characterize the Second Circuit's holding otherwise is
to conceive its implications narrowly.
E. Recent Decisions Under Section 1350
Two suits brought under the Section 1350 since Filartigaconfirm
that jurisdictional limits prescribed under Section 1350 are indeed
narrow. In Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 87 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated two
actions alleging multiple tortious acts by personal representatives of
twenty-nine individuals who died in a terrorist attack on a bus in

14

See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820). Pirates were the first to be

deemed guilty of acts so egregious that refuge in a foreign state did not insulate them from
liability. U.S. v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 193 (1820). This concept was later extended to
slave traders in La Jeane Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (D.Mass. 1821). Prior to these decisions, the
victims of such acts were not protected when the alleged acts took place outside the United
States. Nor were the individuals committing these acts under the color of legal authority subject
to suit. See also, Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 60. Here the authors state: "... pirates
appear to have acted frequently under the color of national authority, being in some instances
captains who became renegades after receiving a lawful commission."
815Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347 (1981).
86 630 F.2d at 880.
87 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Other defendants in addition to the Libyan Arab
Republic were the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine Information Office, the
National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America.
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Israel. The plaintiffs alleged that a federal claim existed based on
diversity of citizenship, and federal question jurisdiction. Since diversity of citizenship does not exist when the litigants are both aliens, the
plaintiffs needed to rely on some other aspect of federal law to support
federal jurisdiction. 88 In an opinion by Judge Joyce Green, the District
Court dismissed this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court did not find that the plaintiffs had adequately presented a
federal question for review. It reasoned that no private cause of action
can be based on a treaty or on general norms of international law
when the facts do not properly allege a tortious injury which violates
these norms. The plaintiffs had alleged such general intentional tort
claims as assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, in addition to charges of conspiracy. The Court responded that
general tortious injuries cannot provide a basis for a cause of action
under federal common law unless the acts involved are in violation of
the law of nations. The tortious acts alleged in Hanoch Tel-Oren are
not well-defined or universally recognized violations of international
law which are of a mutual concern to all nations. The Court did not
reach the issue of whether terrorism violates customary international
law.
In Verlinden B. V. v. CentralBank of Nigeria,89 a Dutch corporation sued the Central Bank of Nigeria for anticipatory breach of
contract when the bank failed to pay a letter of credit. The Central
Bank of Nigeria, an organ of the Nigerian government, failed to pay
for a shipment of cement because the Verlinden Corporation had not
previously acquired permission to enter the Nigerian port. The Dutch
90
corporation sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Here, the Second Circuit upheld dismissal by the Southern District of
New York for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since the claim
asserted was not based either on state or international law. The court
also noted in passing that "commercial violations do not constitute
'
breaches of international law under Section 1350.' "9 The Hanoch and
Verlinden decisions confirm that the ambit of Section 1350 after
Filartigashould be limited to cases involving well-defined violations
of customary international law. 9 2
8 Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 53, citing Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 26 (1965).
" 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
0 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d) and 1602-11.
9' 647 F.2d at 325, note 16.
12 517 F. Supp. at 546. The Verlinden Court states that it did not reach the issue of whether
the defendant's conduct violated the law of nations, a question fundamentally different from
whether treaties or international law can generally provide a cause of action.
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IV.

ABSTENTION

Even when the federal courts have jurisdiction there are circumstances where they should refrain from deciding a case. Two principle
reasons for the federal courts to abstain from deciding a case like
Filartigaare forum non conveniens and the act of state doctrine.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,9 3 the Supreme Court listed four
factors that should be considered in a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens: (1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) relative ease of
access to sources of proof; (3) availability and cost of witnesses; (4) the
enforceability of the judgement; (5) procedural barriers to a fair trial;
(6) administrative convenience of the court; and (7) possible difficulties in applying law foreign to the forum. The emphasis on particular
factors in specific cases changes when questions of international law
are involved, particularly in suits between aliens.14 Before considering
these factors note that a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens
ordinarily assumes that an alternative forum exists on which to base
such a motion. The facts indicate that even if the FilartigaCourt had
reached this issue, the political situation in Paraguay, and particularly
the judiciary's subservient role to the executive, would deny the plaintiffs any chance of a fair and impartial trial in Paraguay.9 5 Without
the chance of a fair trial in Paraguay such policy considerations
become moot.
In Hoffman v. Goberman,9 6 the Third Circuit enunciated a twopronged test for findingforum non conveniens in cases having international aspects. It requires the moving party to show that the forum
state "(1) establish oppression and vexation of a defendant as to be out
of all proportion to the plaintiff's convenience, which may be shown
to be slight or non-existent, or (2) make trial in the chosen forum
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems. ' 97 It seems unlikely that Pena or
most other government officials guilty of torture could meet such a
test, once jurisdiction is established.

93330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
11 See Swift & Company Packers v. Compania Columbiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684,

697 (1950).
" See also Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 103-04.

96 420 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1970).
97 Id.
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B. Act of State
The act of state doctrine precludes judicial review of the acts of a
government official in the courts of another nation. This issue was not
reached in Filartigabecause it was not advanced by the defendant on
appeal. Nevertheless, the Court noted the unlikelihood that action by
a state official violating his own country's laws would be granted
protection as an act of state. Additionally, while acts of torture are
generally renounced as official state policy, the Filartiga Court did
not feel that this should "strip the tort of its character as an international law violation." 98 This reasoning stifles the threat of dismissal
posed by the act of state doctrine. In fact, the doctrine seems more
relevant to cases involving the civil liability of an individual defendant
who could arguably claim to be acting as an agent of the government,
while the government in turn denied the legality of the act. Filartigo
also averted the potential threat posed by Sabbatino.99 Dismissal on
the grounds that the case presents a political question occurs only
where the case is not controlled by a clear consensus in international
law.100 The Second Circuit's reasoning is clear on this point. Undeniably, a prohibition against torture has now emerged as a current norm
in international law.
CONCLUSION

Read narrowly, the Filartiga decision adds a private cause of
action for a limited class of cases alleging torture based on customary
international law. The question of what other norms might be said to
have achieved this status was left undecided by the court. Although
the case apparently opens the door to law suits alleging violations of
well-recognized human rights, the decision in Hanoch Tel-Oren suggests that it may be difficult for plaintiffs to establish the existence of
such a consensus. Certainly an allegation of slavery will support federal jurisdiction under the Filartiga test, while an allegation of political imprisonment alone would probably not, at this stage of the law's
development.
The Filartigadecision has produced some juridicial apprehension. Such criticism may reflect the national political climate and a
recent growth of pessimism with respect to the ability of international

630 F.2d at 890.
11 376 U.S. 398 supra note 71.
'00Blum and Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 108, citing Banco Nationale de Cuba v. Sabbatino
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
98
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law to deal with contemporary problems of the international community. Nevertheless, the holding is consistent with international standards promoting the human rights of all citizens by basing a private
claim on customary international law. It is properly characterized as
the culmination of thirty years of history of international treaties and
accords that have been progressing steadily towards making human
rights the enforceable rights of individuals. Filartiga advances this
notion without denying, offending or fragmenting the claims of those
critics who insist that only a world criminal court can implement any
significant degree of human rights protection. Further, the question of
whether a private cause of action can be based on international law is
no longer prospective. For cases alleging torture, international law
provides a basis for jurisdiction in the federal district courts of the
United States under the Alien Tort Statute.

